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Existing cross-country studies have increasingly confirmed the negative relationship 
between ethnic diversity and redistribution. These studies, however, have mainly focused 
on the measurement of ethnic diversity and have neglected an important perspective in 
their empirical analyses: before proving ethnic diversity harms redistribution, one has to 
show that people do identify with their ethnic groups in political decisions regarding 
redistribution instead of other potentially salient identities. Reinvestigating the hypothesis 
in a proper framework, I find no evidence that ethnic diversity negatively affect 
redistribution. I also find evidence of a supportive role of decentralization in promoting 
redistribution given critically high levels of diversity and segregation of ethnic groups. 
The findings pose important questions to other empirical studies regarding the impact of 
ethnic diversity that have paid inadequate attention to its theoretical complexity. 
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“The difficulty with the thesis of the clash of civilizations begins well 
before we come to the issue of an inevitable clash; it begins with the 
presumption of the unique relevance of a singular classification.” 
Amartya Sen, 2006: 11. 
 
1. Introduction 
Redistribution has been subject to an ongoing debate in public policies not only because 
of its functional impact on poverty alleviation, economic inequality, and economic 
growth but also because of its philosophical connection to the debate on social justice. As 
a consequence, there has been a growing literature, theoretical as well as empirical, aimed 
at gaining a better understanding of the causes and effects of redistributive policies across 
countries1. And according to more recent empirical studies, ethnic diversity – roughly 
defined, the probability that two randomly selected persons from a given country do not 
belong to the same ethnic group – has been singled out as one of the important predictors 
of cross-country differences in redistribution 2 . These studies have confirmed the 
existence of a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and redistribution by using 
various measures of ethnic diversity. Since ethnicity is hard to change, the negative 
impact appears to be, rhetorically speaking, a destiny. The point is best illustrated in the 
spirit of a recent study: “The wide variety of indices used in the literature partially stems 
from the fact that some economic and social outcomes can be explained by societal 
diversity, whereas others are better captured by polarization... Again, the question of 
which index does a better job at explaining redistribution is an empirical one” (Desmet et 
al., 2009, p. 1293). To paraphrase, it is evident that people identify with their ethnicity in 
political decisions on redistribution, and what researchers have to do is to find an index 
that best proves the negative impact of ethnic diversity in the statistical contest. I 
demonstrate in the present paper, however, that the problem in question is more crucial a 
theory-driven empirical exercise rather than one chiefly concerned with measurement. 
                                                 
1 See Persson and Tabellini (2000), chapter 6, for a theoretical review; Alesina and Glaeser (2004) and 
Lindert (2004b) for two comprehensive empirical works. See also Lindert (2004a) for a historical account 
of the evolution of social spending since the eighteenth century. 
2 They are, by chronology, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999); Alesina, Glaeser, and 
Sacerdote (2001); Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003); Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, 
and Weber (2005, 2009); and Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Wacziarg (2012). See also Stichnoth and Van der 
Straeten (2013) for a list of other earlier and less powerful evidences. 
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In a critique of Huntington’s (1996) thesis of the clash of civilizations, and 
communitarian approach to identity in general, Sen (2006, p. 11) asserts: “Indeed, the 
question “do civilizations clash?” is founded on the presumption that humanity can be 
preeminently classified into distinct and discrete civilizations, and that the relations 
between different human beings can somehow be seen, without serious loss of 
understanding, in terms of relations between different civilizations. The basic flaw of the 
thesis much precedes the point where it is asked whether civilizations must clash.” His 
critique applies directly to the case of ethnic diversity and suggests a proper two-steps 
strategy to verify its negative impact on redistribution: first, identify all the salient 
identities and prove that people do identify with their ethnicity in political decisions 
regarding redistribution rather than other identities; second, show that ethnic diversity 
negatively affects redistribution. Like Huntington, the fundamental flaw of existing 
studies lies in the fact that they, explicitly or implicitly, accept the first step as a matter of 
fact and concentrate most of their efforts in tackling with the second one. In other words, 
they have failed to control for all potentially salient identities in their empirical analyses. 
 Rather than involving in the dispute over the definition of ethnicity3, I adopt in 
the present study the constructivist conceptualization of ethnicity as does Posner (2005). 
Posner (2005) argues that people own a repertoire of ethnic identities (e.g. language, race, 
tribe, and religion) whose relevance wax and wane with changes in context. In fact, 
Posner (2005) employs an equivalent two-steps strategy to the one described above to 
investigate ethnic politics in Zambia. He first identified the repertoires of potentially 
mobilizable ethnic identities that people have, and then explained why they choose one of 
the ethnic identities rather than others in political arena4. In the present study, I embrace a 
broader context of identity competition to examine whether people choose ethnicity in 
general rather than other potentially salient identities such as income class, age group, 
and political ideology when making political decisions regarding redistribution. 
 In addition to the above underlying drawback, scrutinizing the relevant theories 
on ethnic diversity and redistribution reveals another missing point in existing studies. 
Intuitively, if two countries have the same level of ethnic diversity, then the country 
                                                 
3 See Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) for a review of this literature. 
4 See also Caselli and Coleman (2013) for another theoretical model in this literature which relates ethnic 
identities to the individual cost of switching identity. 
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whose ethnic groups reside in separate geographical regions which are decentralized the 
power to decide redistributive policies themselves is expected to tackle ethnic conflicts 
better and to bring about higher levels of redistribution. Taking into account ethnic 
segregation and decentralization, therefore, is not only an econometric imperative, but 
also a policy-driven impetus. The argument relates to a broader literature on the role of 
federalism in resolving ethnic conflicts in ethnically segregated countries which is often 
called ethno-federalism5. To the extent of my knowledge, however, no empirical studies 
have investigated the impact of ethno-federalism on redistribution. 
 The present study aims to amend the two shortcomings of existing studies 
discussed above by conducting an empirical analysis guided by the two-steps strategy 
described above. In general, the ultimate conclusion is that ethnic diversity is not destined 
to a negative impact on redistribution as prevalently demonstrated. The conclusion is 
founded on two novel findings. First, I find no evidence that ethnically diverse countries 
have lower level of redistribution on average when all the salient identities are taken into 
account. Second, I also find evidence of a supportive role of decentralization in 
promoting redistribution given critically high levels of ethnic diversity and segregation 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I scrutinize important 
existing cross-country evidences and display in details their shortcomings. In section 3, 
the relevant theories are systematically investigated in order to detect all potentially 
salient identities which have not been taken into account in existing studies. Section 4 
discusses in details the measurement of the main variables, their econometric problems, 
and the data sources. Section 5 presents the main findings of the empirical analyses. 
Finally, section 6 closes the paper with some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Existing Empirical Evidences: A Critical Review 
In general, existing empirical studies on the link between ethnic diversity and 
redistribution can be categorized into three groups which treat redistribution as: (i) an 
indicator of the quality of government, (ii) a conflict between the rich and the poor, and 
(iii) a battle between ethnic groups. Obviously, only the third group tackles the problem 
directly, and it shall be taken up after examining the first two groups. 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Bunce (2004), Coakley (2003), and Juhász (2005). 
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  The initial evidence is probably discovered by La Porta et al. (1999) who argue 
that ethnic diversity undermines the size of government because “the [ethnic] groups that 
come to power fashion government policies that expropriate (or kill) the ethnic losers, 
restrict their freedom of opposition, and limit the production of public goods to prevent 
those outside the ruling group from also benefiting and getting stronger” (p. 231). Using 
the traditional ethnolinguistic fractionalization index 6  (ELF) as a measure of ethnic 
diversity, the authors showed that higher level of diversity is associated with lower level 
of redistribution as measured by government transfers and subsidies as percentage of 
gross domestic product (GDP) while controlling for a bundle of variables derived from 
the theoretical framework of the quality of government. The negative relationship, 
however, disappears when GDP per capita and latitude are taken into account. Adopting 
the same strategy, Alesina et al. (2003) enhance the power of the evidence by 
constructing another index called ethnic fractionalization which uses language and racial 
characteristics to categorize ethnic groups. The authors showed that their result is robust 
when controlling for GDP per capita and population (to capture country size), though not 
when controlling for latitude. The authors also found that the index is superior to the 
traditional ELF and religious fractionalization indices as regards empirical performance. 
In fact, although treating redistribution as an indicator of the quality of government, the 
two studies do employ the theories of ethnic conflict as their theoretical ground. 
 In a comprehensive study of redistribution as a conflict between the rich and the 
poor, Alesina et al. (2001) find a negative relationship between racial fractionalization 
index and social spending as percentage of GDP. The result is robust after controlling for 
GDP per capita and a bundle of variables (without latitude) taken from the specifications 
of Persson and Tabellini (2001) who study the impact of political institutions on fiscal 
policy outcomes. The theoretical prediction of the finding is that ethnic diversity reduces 
altruism toward the poor assuming that people care about the consumption of others as 
well as their own, and in turn reduces redistribution. As shown in the next section, 
altruism is only one among many potential mechanisms through which ethnic diversity 
may affect redistribution, let alone may be not the dominant one. 
                                                 
6 See Easterly and Levine (1997), who are often regarded as the initiators of the research area in economics, 
for details of the index. 
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 The third group of studies tackles the question by employing a more relevant 
theoretical framework that link ethnic diversity directly to redistribution. The theoretical 
discussion, however, is brief; and all studies only concentrate on the measurement issue 
of ethnic diversity. In general, the authors argue that a measure of ethnic diversity should 
explicitly take into account the distinctiveness between ethnic groups7. Adopting the 
same list of control variables from La Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003) and 
adding a small island dummy, Desmet et al. (2005) confirm the negative relationship for 
the so-called peripheral ELF index which only captures the conflicts emanate from the 
central dominant group and other peripheral minor groups, not from among the latter 
groups themselves. The index takes into account the distinctiveness between groups by 
using lexicological statistics for 95 Indo-European languages which focus on 200 basic 
meanings to compute the proportion of cognates between each pair languages. Their 
finding is robust with the presence of latitude. Using the same strategy as Desmet et al. 
(2005) and adding the fraction of population over 65, Desmet et al. (2009) find a similar 
result for the traditional ELF index which captures the distance between groups by the 
proportion of shared branches in linguistic tree diagram. In an extension, Desmet et al. 
(2012) calculate the ELF index at different levels of linguistic aggregation and find that 
only high levels matter for redistribution. The authors then conclude: “solidarity travels 
without trouble across groups that are separated by shallow [ethnolinguistic] gullies, but 
not across those separated by deep [ethnolinguistic] canyons” (p. 332). The final evidence 
is, probably, the most powerful one at the moment. 
 A common pattern of all the studies examined above is that they either rely on 
improper theoretical frameworks or focus mainly on the measurement of ethnic diversity. 
The neglect of the pertinent theoretical framework which links ethnic diversity directly to 
redistribution has, at least, three serious consequences. First, the evidences are unreliable 
because all the control variables are added based on improper theoretical foundations. In 
other words, all the above studies have failed to take into account all potentially salient 
identities to make sure that people do identify with their ethnic groups in political 
                                                 
7 In fact, all the indices mentioned before implicitly assume the distance between one group and every other 
is uniformly 1 (Desmet et al., 2009). The assumption means, for example, the distance between Catalan and 
Spanish speakers in Andorra is the same as the distance between Dutch and French speakers in Belgium 
which is unreasonable. 
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decisions regarding redistribution. In the next section, I demonstrate that there are, at 
least, two important identities which have been omitted. Second, the interaction of ethnic 
segregation and decentralization has been overlooked. The theoretical framework 
surveyed below suggests that the interaction is expected to mitigate the negative impact 
of ethnic diversity on redistribution, if any. Last but not least, lacking a coherent 
theoretical framework makes the existing evidences difficult to interpret with precision, 
let alone their policy implications. In particular, I argue in the following sections that the 
conclusion of Desmet et al. (2012) cited above is fundamentally flawed. 
 
3. Ethnic Diversity and Redistribution: An Appealing Relationship 
3.1. Theoretical Framework 
Conventional economic analysis often regards redistribution as a political battle between 
the rich and the poor. The general intuition behind the hypothetical negative relationship 
between ethnic diversity and redistribution is that people in ethnically diverse societies, 
both rich and poor, are more likely to build coalitions along ethnic lines to compete for 
and divert public resources from redistribution to their private benefits because the 
strategy brings them higher utility. It is exactly the sources of utility that distinguish 
between different theoretical branches. 
The first branch emphasizes the standard source of utility, i.e. the consumption of 
goods and services. In other words, people only employ their identities as instruments to 
maximize their economic well-being by building coalitions to fight for public resources. 
The most general model is probably the one proposed by Fernández and Levy (2008) 
who study the equilibrium of a game in which coalitions of individuals with different 
incomes form parties, parties propose platforms, and all people vote, with the winning 
policy chosen by plurality. The platforms specify the values of two policy tools: a general 
proportional redistributive tax which is lump-sum rebated and a series of taxes used to 
fund the specific goods targeted to particular interest groups. The model shows that the 
amount of targeted goods grows in the expense of overall redistribution as the level of 
diversity increases because, intuitively, the rich can form coalition with interest groups 
among the poor to make each better off: the rich incurs lower level of total taxes, and the 
poor receives higher net gain (lower overall redistribution but higher targeted goods). As 
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diversity increases further, however, the situation is less sustainable because the cost of 
providing targeted goods also rises with the number of interest groups which renders the 
compromise unfeasible. Although theoretically interesting, the situation is unlikely to 
occur in reality because in face of high degree of diversity in one cleavage, people always 
have other (less diverse) cleavages to form coalitions. In the model, diversity may arise 
from differences in preferences (maybe owning to ethnic and religious affiliations), 
geographic locations, or individual abilities to join special interest groups that participate 
in the political arena. Another relevant model in the branch is Alesina, Baqir, and 
Easterly (1999) who employ the median voter framework to study the impact of diversity 
of preferences on public goods provision. 
Following the spirit of Becker (1971) to embrace non-pecuniary motivations into 
economic reasoning, the second branch highlights altruism as a source of utility – people 
have stronger feelings of identification towards their own group than other groups8. In 
other words, people gain disutility from voting for redistributive programs which can be 
enjoyed by the poor members of other ethnic groups. The most relevant model in the 
branch is the one developed by  Lind (2007) who employs the median voter framework to 
study voting behaviors of people who are members of two distinct groups, with one 
group is assumed to be richer than the other by the first order stochastic dominance. 
People are assumed to have social conscience (i.e. they do not only care about their own 
utility but also the social welfare level) and group antagonism (i.e. they put lower weight 
or completely ignore the welfare of other groups). These preferences mean that the 
members of the poorer group would support for redistribution while those of the richer 
group would not. In a restrictive manner, the model shows that an increase in diversity 
lowers redistributive tax rate. Furthermore, between groups inequality is demonstrated to 
have a negative impact on redistributive tax rate, whereas within group inequality has a 
positive effect on redistributive tax rate. Other relevant models in the branch are Alesina 
et al. (2001) and Roemer (1998), both also assume, by implication, that one group is 
richer than the other, at least in the eyes of richer group members, and do not model 
diversity directly. The first model employs the median voter framework, while the second 
                                                 
8 The categorization, based on the fact that altruism is modeled as a context-free preference in the models 
of the branch as does Becker (1971), is just for the convenience of presentation and does not imply that all 
the authors share the same reasoning with Becker (1971). 
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uses the multi-dimensional political competition framework to introduce a non-economic 
issue (e.g. religion or ethnicity) besides an economic one (i.e. income). 
Brushing aside many restrictive assumptions adopted in the models of the branch, 
its context-free approach to non-pecuniary motivations with respect to political decisions 
on redistribution is still problematic in explaining reality. Consider an illustrative 
example documented by Posner (2004b) regarding the political divisions of the Chewa 
and Tumbuka people in Zambia and Malawi: in Zambia, the two ethnic groups are allies 
while they are adversaries in Malawi. If altruism is at work, one has to explain why the 
same ethnic groups are altruistic towards each other in one country and antagonistic in 
the other. The possibility that the same context-free preference can change so easily is 
hard to be justified. Another possibility to save the approach is to accept that although 
people have non-pecuniary motivations regarding political decisions, it is the pecuniary 
ones that matter the most. In fact, the argument is in line with Posner (2004b, 2005) who 
argues ethnicity is mainly a political instrument, but in contrast with the empirical 
evidences that the models mentioned above seek to explain. 
A more satisfactory approach which has been neglected in existing theoretical 
models as well as empirical studies, to the extent of my knowledge, is identity economics. 
In a nutshell, the branch argues for the validity of the so-called identity utility, i.e. people 
gain utility when their actions conform to the norms and ideals belong to the 
corresponding social categories that people affiliate with, and lose otherwise (Akerlof & 
Kranton, 2000)9. In their terminology, ethnic groups are social categories (identities) that 
people identify with, and if forming coalitions to divert public resources from 
redistribution for the poor to their private benefits is the norm and ideal of each ethnic 
group, people gain identity utilities by acting that way10. The stronger people identify 
with their ethnic groups, the higher identity utilities they get. Identity utility is context-
dependent because it is the norm and ideal that brings about utility. The identity approach 
can simply offer an answer to the drawback mentioned above of the altruism approach in 
the sense that there may be different norms and ideals for the Chewa and Tumbuka 
                                                 
9 People may be or may be not aware of their motivations. See also Akerlof and Kranton (2010) for a more 
comprehensive introduction to identity economics. 
10 Theoretically, norms and ideals may be exogenously given. But in reality, they are often manipulated by 
sectarian politicians, so argued Glaeser (2005). 
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communities in Zambia and Malawi with respect to political decisions. Furthermore, the 
dependence of identity utility on social context also suggests an important argument for 
the empirical strategy which is discussed further in the following section. 
In summary, all the theories point to a negative impact of ethnic diversity on 
redistribution and give the empirical investigation three important notes. First, not all the 
models straightly demonstrate that ethnic diversity matters – there are no apparent 
differences between having two or many ethnic coalitions. The ambiguity opens an 
empirical competition between two types of measure of ethnic antagonism: diversity and 
polarization11. Second, the distinctiveness between ethnic groups is also not explicitly 
shown to be important in all the models. The point is important for choosing the right 
index and is discussed in details in the next section. Third, all the models use voting as 
the mechanism to aggregate social preferences which in turn strictly implies that only 
countries with voting mechanism, or democracy in general, should be considered in 
empirical investigation. Nevertheless, the models should be interpreted to accommodate a 
broader notion of political competition, including both formal and informal, because 
voting is hardly the only mechanism in reality that determines public policies. The 
argument is in line with Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) who show public policies are 
influenced by the interplay between de jure political power (allocated by political 
institutions) and de facto political power (investments to influence the course of politics). 
 
3.2. Competing Identities 
The above theoretical framework apparently suggests that people may identify with any 
identities besides ethnicity when making political decision regarding redistribution as 
long as they can gain higher utility. As a consequence, all the potentially salient identities 
in the context of political decisions on redistribution have to be controlled for in the 
empirical analysis in order to show that people do identify with their ethnic groups. 
Although existing studies have accidentally included some of them (e.g. age groups), it is 
still not exhaustive. In particular, there are two more salient cleavages should definitely 
be taken into account. 
                                                 
11 See Bossert, D'Ambrosio, and La Ferrara (2011) for the characterization of the generalized diversity 
index as well as comparison with other indices, and Esteban and Ray (1994) for the characterization of 
polarization index. 
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First, all the models mentioned above are built on the idea that the presence of 
ethnicity dilutes or even changes the political competition for redistribution from a 
conflict between the rich and the poor into a battle between ethnic groups. Therefore, one 
must control for income inequality in order to empirically test this hypothesis. In other 
words, before proving that ethnic diversity matters, one has to assure that people do 
identify with their ethnic groups instead of income classes. Theoretically, identity utility 
may also exist when people identify with their income classes. Surprisingly, no cross-
country studies have included income inequality in their regressions given the large 
amount of empirical studies regarding its impact on redistribution12. 
Second, the most important, although subtle, difference between the two 
approaches to non-pecuniary motivations regarding political decisions on redistribution is 
that if altruism is the only source of utility at work, poor people in the richer group will 
definitely vote against redistribution; but if identity is the only source of utility, the 
outcome is not necessarily the same. This is because ethnicity is not the sole social 
category that people may affiliate with, and gaining utility by conforming to the norms 
and ideals of their ethnic groups also means that people get disutility by not conforming 
to the other social categories whose norms and ideals are opposite to the ones of their 
own ethnic groups. In other words, if people vote against redistribution just because they 
do not want members from other ethnic groups to receive the benefits, they are getting 
disutility if they identify with any other social categories outside their own ethnic groups 
whose norms and ideals are equivalent to, for example, “all men are created equal” 
regardless of their ethnicity. Thus, the stronger identification people have with the 
relevant social categories, the less likely they identify with their ethnic groups, and the 
more likely they vote for redistribution. Undoubtedly, there is one social category 
contains the norm and ideal in question which should be termed “anti-discrimination”. 
Similar to income inequality, before showing that ethnic diversity negatively affects 
redistribution, one has to demonstrate that people do identify with their ethnic groups 
instead of anti-discrimination. 
 But does identity utility exist? Or are all the non-pecuniary motivations are just 
context-free altruism? Akerlof and Kranton (2010) document a huge amount of narrative 
                                                 
12 See Bénabou (1996) and Milanovic (2000) for two reviews of this literature. 
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accounts from sociology as well as experimental evidences from sociological psychology 
and behavioral economics which convincingly prove the existence of identity utility in 
many social contexts. In the context of redistribution, Klor and Shayo (2010) conduct an 
interesting experiment based on Minimum Group framework to show the significant role 
of identity utility in explaining voting behavior. The authors recruited 180 students from 
the pool of undergraduates from the Faculty of Social Sciences or the Faculty of 
Humanities at Hebrew University of Jerusalem to take part in an experiment where 
subjects were accordingly divided into two equal groups, knew their gross incomes and 
the overall average gross income, then voted anonymously over a redistributive scheme 
consisting of a linear tax and a lump sum transfer which was chosen by majority rule. 
The only difference between the treatment and the control groups was that subjects in the 
treatment group were informed about the existence and the size of two groups, their 
group affiliation, and knew the mean gross income of each group. The authors found that 
subjects in the treatment group systematically deviate from monetary payoff 
maximization towards the tax rate that benefits their group when the monetary cost of 
doing so was not too high. The experiment is hardly representative for real political 
decisions regarding redistribution, but the fact that individual behaviors are so susceptible 
to such a weak natural grouping does prove the existence of identity utility13. 
 
3.3. Decentralization and Segregation 
Another implication of the theoretical framework is that all the factors affect the payoffs 
of building coalitions along ethnic lines are expected to influence the relationship 
between ethnic diversity and redistribution. The argument points to an important role of 
ethnic segregation and decentralization in mitigating the negative impact of ethnic 
diversity on redistribution.  
To elaborate this argument, consider three hypothetical countries A, B, and C in 
which country A is ethnically homogeneous, whereas country B and C have the same 
levels of ethnic diversity. As implied by the theoretical framework, A has a higher level 
                                                 
13  In fact, the authors argued that the identity utility comes from caring about the group status, not 
conforming to norm and ideal because there is no norm and ideal in their experimental design. This is not 
necessarily true because (1) caring about the group status itself might be a norm and ideal, and (2) norm 
and ideal might exist well before subjects took part in the experiment. 
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of redistribution than B and C if other things being equal. Assuming that B has ethnic 
groups living in different geographical units which are decentralized the power to decide 
redistributive policies themselves, then all sub-national units are ethnically homogeneous. 
As a result, all three motivations behind building coalitions along ethnic lines cease to 
exist in B; and B is expected to have a higher level of redistribution than C if C only has 
either ethnic segregation or decentralization, or none. Furthermore, the mitigating effect 
may be large enough to cancel the negative impact of ethnic diversity and bring B a 
higher level of redistribution compared to A. Apparently, decentralization alone does not 
help if the levels of ethnic diversity in sub-national units are the same with the national 
level in general, and so does ethnic segregation if the power to decide redistributive 
policies are not decentralized. In other words, ethnically diverse countries with ethnic 
segregation and decentralization are theoretically better than their counterparts, who have 
either one or none of the two features, in tackling ethnic antagonism in redistributive 
policies because these policies are, partially or completely, decentralized to ethnically 
homogeneous sub-national units. 
 The hypothesis relates to a broader literature on the role of ethno-federalism in 
resolving ethnic conflicts, supporting democratic politics, and strengthening state 
viability. Bunce (2004) defines four general features of ethno-federalism: (i) territorially 
defined subunits; (ii) dual sovereignty where the center and the subunits each have their 
own political and economic spheres of responsibility; (iii) a relationship between the 
center and the subunits that combines autonomy and coordination; and (iv) the subunits 
are composed of geographically concentrated ethnic groups. In general, the performance 
of ethno-federalism is mixed and seems to depend on the initial condition within which it 
is installed (Bunce, 2004). In a relevant empirical study, however, Charron (2009) finds 
that ethno-federalism outperforms unitary system as regards the quality of government 




The theoretical framework suggests the proper measure of redistribution is all public 
programs from which all people can benefit as soon as they are legally eligible, 
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regardless of their ethnicity. The variable, therefore, should be aggregated at general 
government level. It goes without saying that every public policy has its redistributive 
aspect to some extent, explicitly or by implication (Tullock, 1997). The fact makes 
redistribution not straightforward to be defined in practice. Nevertheless, conventional 
economic analysis often focuses on public spending that explicitly favors the poor14. 
Following the convention, all the cross-country studies reviewed above employ 
the same measure of redistribution as initially used by La Porta et al. (1999): general 
government transfers and subsidies as percentage of GDP averaged for three years 1985, 
1990, and 1995. Alesina et al. (2001) is an exception who use central government social 
spending instead. According to International Monetary Fund (2001, p. 10): “The general 
government sector consists of all government units and all nonmarket NPIs [nonprofit 
institutions] that are controlled and mainly financed by government units”. Although this 
measure may have serious problems which are discussed in details below, I still employ it 
in the present study because the purpose is to show that the negative relationship between 
ethnic diversity and redistribution is not as robust as found in existing studies given the 
potentially problematic nature of the measure. The studied period is, however, from 2000 
to 2005 instead for two reasons. First of all, the coverage and quality of the data are 
clearly better not only for transfers and subsidies but also for other variables as well. 
Second, the period is chosen to partially mitigate the endogeneity problem of ethnic 
diversity which is discussed further below. The main findings in the next section hold for 
other periods (i.e. 2000-2003, 2000-2007, 2000-2010) and are available upon request. 
A deeper investigation into the dataset of this measure, which is from Economic 
Freedom of the World Project (Gwartney, Hall, & Lawson, 2012), discovers serious 
caveats. Because there is no detailed information on the components of transfers and 
subsidies in all the annual reports of Economic Freedom of the World Project, I have to 
resort to their primary data sources. According to the International Monetary Fund (2001), 
government transfers on the expense side consist of social security benefits, social 
assistance benefits, and employer social benefits among others; and subsidies include 
subsidies to public corporations and private enterprises. Whereas there is no doubt that 
ethnic groups may also compete for subsidies granted to public corporations and private 
                                                 
14 See Alesina and Glaeser (2004) for a typical example. 
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enterprises, it is hard to justify the subsidies as public programs from which all people 
regardless of their ethnicity can benefit. 
Consider first the definition of subsidy. According to International Monetary 
Fund (2001, p. 70), “subsidies are current unrequited payments that government units 
make to enterprises on the basis of the levels of their production activities or the 
quantities or values of the goods or services they produce, sell, export, or import”. For 
example, the subsidies can be on “payroll or workforce, which are payable on the total 
wage or salary bill, the size of the total workforce, or the employment of particular types 
of persons; subsidies to reduce pollution; and payments of interest on behalf of 
corporations” (p. 70). This definition suggests that if the public corporations and private 
enterprises are mainly occupied by one ethnic group, then these subsidies are nothing but 
ideal targeted goods15. As a consequence, including them in the measure of redistribution 
is theoretically (and also practically if their fractions are large) problematic. Transfers 
and subsidies as percentage of GDP may be not a good indicator of the quality of 
government as noted by La Porta et al. (1999), it is definitely not a proper measure of 
redistribution to study the impact of ethnic diversity. 
Therefore, in order to investigate the hypothesis in a better manner, I employ a 
more exact measure of redistribution which is public social expenditure as percentage of 
GDP averaged from 2000 to 2005. Public social expenditure consists of benefits from old 
age, survivors, incapacity related, health, family, active labor market programs, 
unemployment, housing, and other social policy areas. Data of this measure are taken 
from Social Expenditure Statistics of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) which is of high quality, but covers only 34 countries. The main 
findings in the next section hold for other periods (i.e. 2000-2003, 2000-2007, 2000-
2010) and are available upon request. 
 
4.2. Ethnic Diversity: Measurement and Endogeneity 
In the simplest version, the ethnic diversity index measures the probability that two 
randomly selected persons from a given country do not belong to the same ethnic group: 
                                                 
15 The same argument can be applied, at a lesser extent, to employer social benefits whose definition can be 
found at International Monetary Fund (2001, p. 72). 
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where pk is the population share of groups k. An important, but often overlooked, 
implication of all the theories investigated above is that all the ethnic groups must be 
relevant and eligible to compete in political arena. Undoubtedly, not all ethnic groups are 
politically relevant and the exact measure of ethnic diversity must take into account only 
the relevant ones (Posner, 2004a). The example of the Chewa and Tumbuka peoples in 
Zambia and Malawi mentioned above is an illustration of the idea that the presence of 
ethnic groups does not necessarily mean the existence of ethnic coalitions. The argument 
is also supported by Campos and Kuzeyev (2007) who investigate 26 former communist 
countries in the period from 1989 to 2002 and find that the countries remarkably became 
more homogeneous over the period with respect to ethnicity (e.g. Moldavian, Romanian, 
and Russian), but not language and religion. Rather than using diversity indices based on 
language and/or race, Posner (2004a) suggests using a diversity index based on politically 
relevant ethnic groups (PREG) and constructs the index for 42 African countries. 
 Although it is not explicitly considered in the theoretical models examined above, 
taking into account the distinctiveness between groups, approximated by linguistic 
differences, has been found to significantly improve the diversity index as regards 
statistical performance [Desmet et al. (2012; 2005, 2009)]. This creates another difficulty 
in constructing the right diversity index because differences between ethnic groups may 
come from language, income, education, and so on (Bossert et al., 2011). As a 
consequence, the construction of an appropriate diversity index requires aggregation 
across all the dimensions of differences. In fact, it is what Bossert et al. (2011) call the 
grouped-version generalized fractionalization index: 










where skl is the similarity matrix of group k and l. 
It goes without saying that constructing a diversity index that can exactly reflect 
the true politically relevant ethnic groups as well as the general differences between them 
in each country is a daunting task. As a result, while waiting for such an ideal index, one 
still has to rely on existing ones. All the indices mentioned above are, of course, not 
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perfect, but they are useful as long as their imperfection is acknowledged. In details, all 
indices should only be interpreted as proxies for the true patterns of ethnic diversity 
whether their categorization of ethnic groups is based on language, race, or religion. And 
a proxy is not necessarily an explanation itself. In Desmet et al.’s (2012) rhetoric, it is not 
that “solidarity travels without trouble across groups that are separated by shallow 
[ethnolinguistic] gullies, but not across those separated by deep [ethnolinguistic] 
canyons”, but categorizing ethnic groups using deep canyons proxies better for the true 
solidarity patterns than using shallow gullies. 
In the spirit of Posner (2004a), one may still argue that even using the above 
interpretation, the procedure of choosing an index that has the best empirical performance 
in order to show the negative relationship between ethnic diversity and redistribution is 
scientifically problematic. Nevertheless, the aim of the present study is to show that the 
link between ethnic diversity and redistribution is not as robust as found in existing 
studies, given their potentially problematic research approach. Therefore, all the proposed 
hypotheses are tested by using the ELF index that takes into account the distinctiveness 
between groups, approximated by the proportion of shared branches in linguistic tree 
diagram, constructed by Desmet et al. (2012) at different levels of linguistic aggregation. 
This is the most powerful index with respect to statistical performance at the moment. 
Another empirical problem of ethnic diversity is endogeneity. First, researchers 
have recognized that there may be reverse causality between ethnic diversity and 
redistribution. For example, different redistributive policies may influence migration 
between countries, the formation of ethnic coalitions within countries, or the fertility rates 
of ethnic groups which in turn may affect ethnic diversity. Nevertheless, the shares of 
ethnic groups are argued to be sufficiently stable so that changes only have a minor 
impact on diversity index (Alesina et al., 2003). The argument is supported by the fact 
that in 42 African countries whose PREG index are available for each decade from 1960 
to 1990, only one country has PREG index changes after three decades and four countries 
change after two decades (Posner, 2004a). In case of language, the study conducted by 
Campos and Kuzeyev (2007) mentioned above find that there are no significant changes 
in linguistic diversity over the period from 1989 to 2002 in 26 former communist 
countries. In addition, the ELF index is constructed at different years for different 
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countries ranging around the period from around 1980 to 2000. Therefore, the reverse 
causality can be largely mitigated since there is no reason to expect that redistribution in 
2000s affects ethnic diversity in, for example, 1990s. Of course, one may still argue that 
people may consider future prospect of redistribution when making decision on migration, 
and their expectations somehow transfer into actual redistribution (e.g. through voting). 
Second, other potential sources of endogeneity come from unobserved country-
specific characteristics which may affect both ethnic diversity and redistribution. For 
example, Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) and Michalopoulos (2012) identify several 
geographical, historical, and political variables that can explain substantially the variation 
in ethnolinguistic diversity across countries. Geographical and historical variables include 
variation in land quality, variation in elevation, latitude, and duration of human 
settlements since prehistoric times. To the extent to which these variables influence 
redistribution through income (Olsson & Hibbs, 2005), the inclusion of GDP per capita in 
the regression may minimize the problems posed by endogeneity. Political variables such 
as national building may also affect redistributive policies. Nevertheless, using value of 
linguistic diversity index in 1960s as instrumental variable for the value in 1990s, Desmet 
et al. (2005) find that endogeneity is unlikely a serious concern. In summary, the 
endogeneity problem of ethnic diversity seems negligible which may explain why 
existing studies, except Desmet et al. (2005), have never tackled them. As a consequence, 
it is adequate for the present study to also treat ethnic diversity as an exogenous variable. 
 
4.3. Income Inequality 
Following conventional empirical investigation, the traditional Gini index is employed to 
capture income inequality. In particular, the Gini index is calculated for gross income – 
i.e. income before taxes and transfers – which is the proper definition of income to study 
redistribution. Undoubtedly, gross income inequality is potentially endogenous because 
redistributive policies may affect individual gross income, and including it may affect the 
estimates of other variables. In order to avoid the problem, the Gini index is calculated by 
taking the average value in the period of 1990-1999. Data of this measure are taken from 
Solt (2009) which is, to the extent of my knowledge, the most suitable dataset for the 
purpose of the present study as regards comparability and coverage. 
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4.4. Anti-Discrimination 
It is intuitively hard to find a variable to capture the strength that people identify with 
anti-discrimination, but I suggest using the educational performance for two reasons. 
First, identities are not just only a matter of discovery, but also a matter of choice – i.e. 
people do have choices, consciously or not, over their identities even when discoveries 
occur (Sen, 1999, 2006). Thus, it is reasonable to argue that education empowers people 
the ability to reason about their identities (and the corresponding norms and ideals) rather 
than simply accepting them as something pre-determined by destiny (e.g. ethnicity). By 
implication, Sen (1999, p. 26) argues: “An Afgan girl today, kept out of school and away 
from knowledge of the outside world, may indeed not be able to reason freely. But that 
does not establish an inability to reason, only a lack of opportunity to do so.” 
Second, education enhances the strength that people identify with anti-
discrimination because conveying the basic human value that “all men are created equal” 
regardless of their ethnicity is indisputably one of the primary goals of the educational 
system. Although religious fractionalization index has been shown to be inferior to its 
competitors based on statistical performance, the above argument is partially supported 
by the empirical evidences on the impact of education on secularization16. If education 
can make people identify less to religious beliefs, it can do so, maybe with much ease, 
with those norms and ideals derived from linguistic, racial, or tribal communities. 
 The empirical studies on the preferences for redistribution based on survey data 
have pointed to a negative relationship between the educational attainment and support 
for redistribution which may indicate that higher educated people often have higher 
expected future income and social mobility (Alesina & Giuliano, 2009). It is, however, 
hard to justify that the average years of schooling may capture income and social 
mobility at the national level. For example, Alesina et al. (2001) show that people in 
European countries and the U.S are different in their opinions about income and social 
mobility, given the similar average years of schooling of these countries. Another 
possibility is that education may also pick up political ideologies and values that 
potentially affect preferences for redistribution such as individualism, libertarianism, or 
                                                 
16  See, for example, Becker, Nagler, and Woessmann (2012); Glaeser and Sacerdote (2008); and 
Hungerman (2011). 
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egalitarianism. It is, however, unlikely that educational systems are essentially designed 
to affect any of these factors. In addition, the fact that socialist legal origin is also 
controlled for, which is discussed further below, renders this possibility more unlikely. 
 Educational performance is measured by the average years of schooling. Similar 
to income inequality, it is potentially endogenous since redistributive policies may 
influence individual educational performance, and including it may affect the estimates of 
other variables. In order to avoid reverse causality, the variable is measured in 1990; all 
the main findings also hold for value from 2000 and are available upon request. Data are 
taken from Cohen and Soto (2007) which is, to the extent of my knowledge, the best 
cross-country dataset in educational performance with respect to quality and coverage. 
 
4.5. Ethnic Segregation and Decentralization: Measurement and Endogeneity 
I employ a dummy variable of ethno-federalism to capture the combination of ethnic 
segregation and decentralization. This is a rough measure because ethno-federalism also 
includes many other features besides decentralization of redistributive policies. The 
measure, however, is the most appropriate one in the context of the present study, to the 
extent of my knowledge. Based on the ethno-federalism literature, Charron (2009) 
identifies 13 ethno-federations as follows: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovia, Canada, 
Ethiopia, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, South Africa, 
Spain, and Switzerland. Except for Nigeria and Saint Kitts and Nevis, data on transfers 
and subsidies are available to all countries. 
 Nevertheless, the most important feature of decentralization suggested by the 
theoretical framework is the power of sub-national governments to decide, partially or 
completely, redistributive policies. This feature is checked with the database of political 
institutions constructed by Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh (2001). Except 
Pakistan, Russia, and South Africa whose data are not available, other ethno-federal 
countries are confirmed by Beck et al. (2001) to have state/province governments possess 
authority over taxing, spending, or legislating. The following analyses, therefore, are 
conducted with and without Pakistan, Russia, and South Africa. 
Although ethno-federalism itself is not our variable of interest, readers should 
note that there may be some country-specific unobserved characteristics that put ethno-
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federalism in place and also affect redistribution. For example, countries that are left-
wing biased may advocate ethno-federation because of their concern with redistribution. 
If one believes that the endogeneity problem of ethno-federalism is somehow transmitted 
to its interaction term with ethnic diversity, which is our variable of interest, the 
consistency of the estimated coefficient of this interaction term can be suspected. 
In an attempt to defy this suspicion, I have tried a range of instrumental variables 
suggested by the literature on fiscal decentralization and ethnic segregation which 
includes country area as argued by Panizza (1999), hypothetical ethnolinguistic 
segregation index constructed by Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011), and geographical 
variables as suggested by Michalopoulos (2012). All of them, however, turn out to be 
weak instruments according to Stock and Yogo’s (2005) critical values; the results are 
available upon request. Since weak instruments are not necessarily better than no 
instruments at all (Kennedy, 2008), I have to rely on the assumption that the potential 
endogeneity of the interaction term between ethno-federalism and ethnic diversity is 
negligible in order to treat it as exogenous in the following statistical analyses. 
 
4.6. Control variables 
The most parsimonious list of control variables employed in the empirical investigation 
includes: (i) the fraction of population over 65, which is used to capture the mobilization 
of the elderly to vote for social spending (Lindert, 2004b); (ii) socialist legal origin, 
which is used to catch the strength that people identify with socialism (Alesina & Fuchs-
Schündeln, 2007); (iii) the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, which is used to control 
for the influence of economic development on preferences of voters regarding private and 
public consumption as conjectured by the so-called Wagner’s law (Mueller, 2003), and 
on institutional quality regarding the efficiency of the tax system (Alesina et al., 2001); 
(iv) the natural logarithm of openness measured by the share of exports plus imports in 
GDP, which is used to account for the insurance element in redistributive programs as 
found in the empirical work of  Rodrik (1998), and also the greater availability of tax 
bases (Goode, 1984); (v) plurality electoral rule, which is used to capture the influence of 
political institutions as found in Persson and Tabellini (2003). Countries that have their 
electoral rules changed in the studied period of redistribution are excluded, and all other 
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variables except socialist legal origin are averages in the period from 1990 to 1999 to 
avoid potential reverse causality. 
In contrast to many existing studies, the present study does not control for 
population and latitude. Although big countries may have small governments because of 
economy of scale in producing public goods (Alesina & Wacziarg, 1998), this is unlikely 
in case of redistributive programs, so argued Alesina et al. (2001). Countries in temperate 
zones have more productive agriculture which has enabled them to develop their 
economies and abilities to redistribute (Olsson & Hibbs, 2005). Nevertheless, there is no 
theoretical ground to believe that latitude affects redistribution directly; since GDP per 
capita is already controlled for, including latitude is unnecessary. 
Similarly, all legal origins (except socialist one which is discussed above) and 
religious affiliations are also deselected since they are purposed to test those hypotheses 
regarding the quality of government, not redistribution. In fact, La Porta et al. (1999) do 
not even have definite theoretical predictions for the impacts of these variables on the 
size of government, let alone the size of government itself is a problematic measure of the 
quality of government as the authors admitted. Furthermore, religious affiliations should 
be considered as a measure of ethnic diversity which uses religion to categorize ethnic 
groups. From this perspective, religious fractionalization index has been shown to be 
inferior to other fractionalization indices with respect to statistical performance (Alesina 
et al., 2003). 
 Finally, I am aware of the omission of income and social mobility which have 
been proved to affect preferences for redistribution in micro-level empirical studies 
(Alesina & Giuliano, 2009). Nevertheless, the omission is unlikely to create any 
significant impact for two reasons. First, it is the perception of income and social 
mobility that matters for redistributive preferences, and they are highly correlated with 
the beliefs in fairness (Alesina et al., 2001) – simply speaking, efforts are duly rewarded 
and the rich is deserved to what they have. But Isaksson and Lindskog (2009) show that 
beliefs in fairness do little to explain differences in preferences for redistribution across 
countries. Second, there is no reasonable argument to justify that perception of income 
and social mobility is correlated with ethnic diversity and ethno-federalism. Hence, in the 
worst case, the efficiency of the estimates is affected, but not their consistency. 
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5. Empirical Analysis 
5.1. Empirical Strategy 
The general equation to be estimated is: 
Redistributioni = α0 + α1EthnicDiversityi + α2IncomeInequalityi + 
α3Antidiscriminationi + α4EthnoFederalismi + 
α5EthnicDiversity*EthnoFederalismi + λXi + εi, 
where X is a vector of control variables which are commonly used in existing cross-
country studies. Appendix A provides detailed information about all variables, and 
appendix B presents their summary statistics and pairwise correlations. 
The investigation estimates two sets of regression models. The first set excludes 
ethno-federalism and its interaction term with ethnic diversity and tests the traditional 
hypothesis about the negative relationship between ethnic diversity and redistribution (α-
1). The second set includes ethno-federalism and its interaction term with ethnic diversity 
which allows us to examine the role of ethno-federalism in mitigating the negative impact 
of ethnic diversity on redistribution (positive sign of α5). In other words, being an ethno-
federation is expected to mitigate, or even cancel out, the negative impact of ethnic 
diversity on redistribution given a specific level of diversity. Note that the magnitude of 
the impact depends on the level of ethnic diversity. It is also worth noting that the 
coefficient of ethno-federalism in the above equation α4, is nothing but the impact of 
being an ethnically-homogeneous federation. 
 
5.2. Main Results 
In the present section, I concentrate only on presenting some representative results; all 
details of other results are available upon request. Table 1 presents the results of 
regressing transfers and subsidies as percentage of GDP on the ELF index calculated at 
the first level of linguistic aggregation which is denoted by ELF(1) and a set of other 
control variables. Column 1 of the table replicates almost the same specification as 
followed by Desmet et al. (2012). Not surprisingly, the coefficient of ELF index is 
negative and significant at 5% level, a result similar to the one reported by Desmet et al. 
(2012), though its absolute size is smaller (4.141 versus 4.472). Moreover, the coefficient 
of ELF index ceases to be significant at 10% level when the linguistic aggregation 
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reaches to the fifth level, compared to the sixth level as reported by Desmet et al. (2012). 
These differences may be due to differences in specification and studied period. But in 
general, the well-known negative relationship between ethnic diversity and redistribution 
continues to hold. 
Table 1. Transfers and Subsidies (2000-2005) and ELF. 
Variables Transfers and Subsidies as Percentage of GDP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ELF(1) –4.141** –3.475* –1.797 –1.586 
 (0.020) (0.093) (0.386) (0.458) 
Gini Index (1990-1999)  –0.053  –0.064 
  (0.293)  (0.227) 
Average Years of Schooling (1990)   0.103 0.094 
     (0.559) (0.590) 
Fraction of Population over 65 0.927*** 0.970*** 1.179*** 1.164*** 
(1990-1999) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Socialist Legal Origin 2.979** 2.388** –0.396 –0.866 
 (0.011) (0.047) (0.794) (0.593) 
Ln GDP Per Capita (1990-1999) 1.248*** 1.050*** 0.415 0.39 
 (0.000)  (0.005) (0.443) (0.477) 
Ln Openness (1990-1999) 0.356 0.280 0.310 0.294 
 (0.576) (0.680) (0.653) (0.678) 
Plurality Electoral Rule (2000-2005) –1.503** –1.684** –1.494** –1.670** 
 (0.033) (0.021) (0.048) (0.031) 
Observations 113 108 79 78 
Adjusted R2 0.779 0.775 0.824 0.824 
Notes: Estimated with OLS, p-values are in parentheses, calculated with robust standard errors. Constant 
terms are suppressed to save space. ELF(1): Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index, calculated at the first 
level of linguistic aggregation. 
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. 
 
 
Column 2 of table 1 adds Gini index to the list of regressors. The coefficient of 
ELF index is still negative but only significant at 10% level and its absolute size 
decreases substantially from 4.141 to 3.475. Nevertheless, it stops being significant at 
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10% level after the third level of linguistic aggregation. Controlling for income inequality 
does change the negative impact of ethnic diversity. Column 3 of table 1 replaces Gini 
index by average years of schooling. The coefficient of ELF index is still negative but 
highly insignificant with a sheer drop in its absolute size from 3.956 to 1.451. 
Furthermore, no levels of linguistic aggregation of the index can survive the significant 
test at 10% level. The coefficient of average years of schooling has the expected sign, 
although not significant. Compared to income inequality, educational performance hits 
the negative impact of ethnic diversity much stronger. Finally, column 4 of table 1 adds 
both Gini index and average years of schooling to the list of regressors. The coefficient of 
ELF index has the expected sign but it is not statistically significant. 
Contrary to Desmet et al. (2012; 2009)’s findings, adding average years of 
schooling also changes the effect of having socialist legal origin on transfers and 
subsidies from positive to negative although it is insignificant. In other words, holding 
education (and other variables) constant, there is no evidence that having socialist legal 
origin brings about higher level of redistribution on average. The coefficient of GDP per 
capita has the expected sign but it is insignificant when average years of schooling is 
added. The coefficient of openness also has the expected sign but it is insignificant, a 
result which is different from Rodrik (1998). Among all specifications and levels of 
linguistic aggregation, only the coefficients of fraction of population over 65 and 
plurality electoral rule are robustly significant with the expected signs which are in line 
with those findings reported by Lindert (2004b) and Persson and Tabellini (2003). 
In order to access the robustness of the results, I re-estimate all regression models 
using social expenditure as percentage of GDP as the dependent variable. The sample 
now only includes OECD countries. The coefficient of ELF index is not significant at 
conventional levels in all regression models at all levels of linguistic aggregation. Ethnic 
diversity does not explain the differences in redistribution across OCED countries. 
Furthermore, the coefficient of average years of schooling is highly significant in 
regression models 3 and 4 at all levels of linguistic aggregation. The size of this 
coefficient is around 1 indicating that one extra average years of schooling is associated 
with 1% increase in the fraction of social expenditure in GDP on average. Again, only the 
coefficients of fraction of population over 65 and plurality electoral rule are robustly 
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significant and have the expected signs in all regression models at all levels of linguistic 
aggregation. The coefficients of GDP per capita and socialist legal origin are negative 
and only significant at conventional levels when average years of schooling is added. 
Finally, the coefficients of Gini index and openness are also insignificant in this sample. 
Table 2. Social Expenditure (2000-2005) and ELF. 
Variables Social Expenditure as Percentage of GDP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ELF(1) –7.103 –7.196 1.705 1.866 
 (0.378) (0.379) (0.862) (0.856) 
Gini Index (1990-1999)  0.090  0.043 
  (0.462)  (0.746) 
Average Years of Schooling (1990)   1.071*** 1.056*** 
    (0.004) (0.008) 
Fraction of Population over 65 1.480*** 1.393*** 1.962*** 1.921*** 
(1990-1999) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Socialist Legal Origin –0.897 0.382 –7.547** –7.053* 
 (0.588) (0.853) (0.038) (0.060) 
Ln GDP Per Capita (1990-1999) –0.734 –0.132 –5.781*** –5.450** 
 (0.533) (0.917) (0.000)  (0.010) 
Ln Openness (1990-1999) –0.226 –0.080 –0.954 –0.876 
 (0.828) (0.941) (0.291) (0.375) 
Plurality Electoral Rule (2000-2005) –3.223** –3.125** –4.045* –3.955* 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.060) (0.083) 
Observations 33 33 26 26 
Adjusted R2 0.727 0.720 0.798 0.787 
Notes: Estimated with OLS, p-values are in parentheses, calculated with robust standard errors. Constant 
terms are suppressed to save space. ELF(1): Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index, calculated at the first 
level of linguistic aggregation. 
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. 
 
 
I now turn to the second set of regression models to examine the role of ethno-
federalism in mitigating the negative impact of ethnic diversity on redistribution. Table 3 
reports the regression results for both measures of redistribution while adding ethno-
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federalism and its interaction term with ELF index to the list of regressors. For 
convenience, the ELF index calculated at the fifth level of linguistic aggregation, which 
is denoted by ELF(5), is chosen to present the results. 
Table 3. Redistribution (2000-2005) and Ethno-Federalism. 
Variables 
Transfers and Subsidies 
as Percentage of GDP 
Social Expenditure  
as Percentage of GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ELF(5) –0.413 –0.972 1.751 0.092 
 (0.771) (0.522) (0.607) (0.985) 
Ethno-Federalism –0.262 –3.605** –0.341 –1.742 
 (0.825) (0.021) (0.862) (0.557) 
ELF(5)*Ethno-Federalism  6.617***  4.389 
  (0.003)  (0.496) 
Gini Index (1990-1999) –0.072 –0.06 0.039 0.03 
 (0.143) (0.243) (0.772) (0.836) 
Average Years of Schooling (1990) 0.095 0.062 1.092** 1.022**  
  (0.590) (0.731) (0.017) (0.050) 
Fraction of Population over 65 1.191*** 1.216*** 1.948*** 1.974*** 
(1990-1999) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Socialist Legal Origin –1.289 –1.334 –7.156** –7.119*   
 (0.411) (0.392) (0.047) (0.059) 
Ln GDP Per Capita (1990-1999) 0.327 0.355 –5.818** –5.774**  
 (0.554) (0.518) (0.024) (0.030) 
Ln Openness (1990-1999) 0.236 0.258 –1.184 –1.367 
 (0.752) (0.724) (0.420) (0.344) 
Plurality Electoral Rule (2000-2005) –1.692** –1.652** –4.199* –4.152*   
 (0.032) (0.037) (0.083) (0.099) 
Observations 78 78 26 26 
Adjusted R2 0.821 0.823 0.775 0.763 
Notes: Estimated with OLS, p-values are in parentheses, calculated with robust standard errors. Constant 
terms are suppressed to save space. ELF(5): Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index, calculated at the fifth 
level of linguistic aggregation. 
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. 
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First, the coefficient of ethno-federalism is negative but insignificant in regression 
models with no interaction term (models 1 and 2) at all levels of linguistic aggregation. 
Nevertheless, adding the interaction term makes the coefficient of ethno-federalism 
significant at 5% level in the case of transfers and subsidies (model 2) at all levels of 
linguistic aggregation, except the first one. Second, the interaction term also has the 
expected positive sign and significant at 10% level in the case of transfers and subsidies 
at all levels of linguistic aggregation (model 2). Both coefficients have similar signs but 
insignificant in the case of social expenditure. In the case of transfers and subsidies, the 
absolute sizes of the coefficients of ethno-federalism and its interaction term with ELF 
index vary across different levels of linguistic aggregation, with the value of the 
interaction term always larger than the one of ethno-federalism. These results suggest that 
being an ethno-federation hurts redistribution in total when ethnic diversity is under a 
critical level, but helps otherwise. Although ethno-federalism itself is not the variable of 
interest in the present study, its negative coefficient indicates that being an ethnically-
homogeneous federation harms redistribution which may be in line with the literature on 
fiscal federalism17. Note that the sign and significance pattern of all other variables are 
almost the same with the results reported in tables 1 and 2. All the main findings are the 
same if Pakistan, Russia, and South Africa are excluded. 
Table 4. Marginal Effect of Ethno-Federalism on Transfers and Subsidies. 
ELF(5) 0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1 
dy/dx -3.61** -2.94** -1.62 -0.30 1.03 2.35* 3.01** 
  (0.018) (0.031) (0.152) (0.774) (0.352) (0.075) (0.040) 
Notes: p-values are in parentheses, calculated by Delta method. ELF(5): Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 
Index, calculated at the fifth level of linguistic aggregation. 
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. 
 
 
As an illustration, I choose the ELF index at the fifth level of linguistic 
aggregation to present the marginal effect of being an ethno-federation on transfers and 
subsidies. The critical level of ethnic diversity is 0.545 – i.e. when ELF index is above 
0.545, the marginal effect of being an ethno-federation is positive. Table 4 and appendix 
C report the marginal effect for different levels of ELF index. The marginal effect ranges 
                                                 
17 See Oates (1999) for a review of this literature. 
  29 
from -3.61 to +3.01 percentage point as ELF index moves from minimum to maximum. It 
is significant at 10% level at either low or high levels of ELF index. As an example, 
when the level of ethnic diversity is at maximum, being an ethno-federation increases 
transfer and subsidies as percentage of GDP three percentage point on average. 
 
5.3. Robustness 
In order to check for robustness of the findings presented in the previous section, I 
conduct a series of exercises. First of all, Desmet et al. (2012; 2005, 2009) include in 
their analyses a dummy variable for small islands, i.e. island countries whose population 
are below 0.5 million, in order to control for outliers. This is a minor concern in the 
present study because no small islands, in terms of the above definition, have data on 
average years of schooling. In all regression models which do not include average years 
of schooling, the results are basically the same if a small island dummy is included.  
Second, all the main findings hold when regional fixed effects are also taken into 
account. For illustration, table 5 reports the regression results for transfers and subsidies 
when regional dummies are controlled for. As found above, no levels of linguistic 
aggregation of ELF index can survive the significant test at 10% level when average 
years of schooling is added, and ethno-federalism is significantly beneficial for transfers 
and subsidies as percentage of GDP at a critical level of ethnic diversity. In addition, the 
coefficients of fraction of population over 65 and plurality electoral rule are robustly 
significant at conventional levels throughout all specifications and levels of linguistic 
aggregation of ELF index. 
As mentioned before, not all the relevant theories explicitly imply if ethnic 
diversity or polarization matters. Desmet et al. (2012; 2009) find that both types of 
indices are quite similar as regards empirical performance once the distinctiveness 
between groups is taken into account. Therefore, I replicate all the above analyses with 
the ethnic polarization index (POL) calculated at different levels of linguistic aggregation 
and find the main results unchanged: no levels of linguistic aggregation of POL index can 
survive the significant test at 10% level when average years of schooling is added; and 
ethno-federalism is significantly beneficial for transfers and subsidies at a critical level of 
ethnic polarization, but only at the first and second levels of linguistic aggregation. The 
results of other variables are almost the same as before. 
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Table 5.  Transfers and Subsidies (2000-2005) and ELF: Regional Fixed Effects. 
Variables Tranfers and Subsidies as Percentage of GDP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ELF(5) -2.514** -2.271* -0.911 -0.799 -1.116 
 (0.049) (0.099) (0.518) (0.567) (0.492) 
Gini Index (1990-1999)  -0.05  -0.033 -0.024 
  (0.332)  (0.512) (0.646) 
Average Years of Schooling   0.165 0.154 0.128 
(1990)   (0.364) (0.401) (0.494) 
Ethno-Federalism     -3.954**  
     (0.017) 
ELF(5)*Ethno-Federalism     6.504**  
     (0.018) 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Regional Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 113 108 79 78 78 
Adjusted R2 0.786 0.778 0.828 0.825 0.824 
Notes: Estimated with OLS, p-values are in parentheses, calculated with robust standard errors. Constant 
terms and control variables are suppressed to save space.  ELF(5): Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index, 
calculated at the fifth level of linguistic aggregation. Control variables include fraction of population over 
65, socialist legal origin, natural logarithm of GDP per capita, natural logarithm of openness, and plurality 
electoral rule. Regional dummies consist of Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, and East 
Asia and Pacific. 
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. 
 
 
Finally, I restrict the analysis to the democratic sample in order to examine the 
theoretical implication mentioned above that only countries with voting mechanism 
should be considered. In order to examine the argument, I employ democracy index 
(ranging from 0 to 10) taken from POLITY IV Project to classify countries. Although the 
index is apparently a rough measure of the effectiveness of voting mechanism, it is the 
most appropriate available measure to the extent of my knowledge. In particular, all the 
above analyses are replicated with the sample of countries whose democracy index is 
above 2. Because all OECD countries are highly democratic, the exercise only focuses on 
transfers and subsidies. As an illustration, table 5 reports the regression results for the 
ELF index at the third level of linguistic aggregation. 
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Table 6.  Transfers and Subsidies (2000-2005) and ELF: Democratic Sample. 
Variables Tranfers and Subsidies as Percentage of GDP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ELF(3) -3.238* -3.186 -0.995 -1.104 -1.1 
 (0.081) (0.101) (0.628) (0.596) (0.615) 
Gini Index (1990-1999)  -0.047  -0.028 -0.026 
  (0.385)  (0.584) (0.615) 
Average Years of Schooling 
(1990)   0.041 0.018 -0.014 
   (0.847) (0.933) (0.951) 
Ethno-Federalism     -2.936**  
     (0.032) 
ELF(3)*Ethno-Federalism     5.676*   
     (0.092) 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Regional Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 95 93 68 67 67 
Adjusted R2 0.797 0.794 0.84 0.836 0.833 
Notes: Estimated with OLS, p-values are in parentheses, calculated with robust standard errors. Constant 
terms and control variables are suppressed to save space. ELF(3): Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index, 
calculated at the third level of linguistic aggregation. Only countries whose democracy index above 2 are 
included. Control variables include fraction of population over 65, socialist legal origin, natural logarithm 
of GDP per capita, natural logarithm of openness, and plurality electoral rule. Regional dummies consist of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, and East Asia and Pacific.  
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. 
 
 
In general, all the main findings hold: there is no negative relationship between 
ELF index and transfers and subsidies as percentage of GDP, and ethno-federalism is 
significantly beneficial for the latter at a critical level of ethnic diversity. The results are 
also robust to other levels of democracy index, but there are three important details. First, 
the statistical performance of ELF index is generally less superior in democratic sample 
regarding significance pattern. Second, the results of ethno-federalism and its interaction 
term with ELF index are decreasingly less robust as the benchmark of the democracy 
index increases. Finally, the coefficients of fraction of population over 65 and plurality 
electoral rule are robustly significant as usually found above. 
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6. Conclusions 
Empirical studies on the impact of ethnic diversity faces two main challenges regarding 
the methodological as well as practical aspects of choosing the right diversity index and 
the exact measure of redistribution. Given these potentially debatable issues, I have 
shown in the present paper that there is no negative relationship between ethnic diversity 
and redistribution as prevalently found in existing studies when investigating the question 
in a proper framework. I have also discovered a role of ethno-federalism in promoting 
redistribution given a critical level of ethnic diversity which lends support to the 
influence of the combination of ethnic segregation and decentralization on redistribution 
in highly ethnically-diverse countries. 
 It goes without saying that causal interpretation of cross-country regressions 
requires that realities can be conceptualized as draws from a common data-generating 
mechanism. To all intents and purposes, I am skeptical of treating heterogeneity across 
countries equivalent to across individuals. As a consequence, intensive country-specific 
studies must be done in order to make further claim on causality. The findings, I believe, 
are helpful in highlighting important data patterns from which policy discussions can be 
built. In other words, if policy makers want to understand the differences in redistribution 
between their countries and others, the foremost issues towards which they should direct 
research efforts are demographic structure, political institutions, and the combination of 
ethnic segregation and decentralization; but not ethnic diversity. 
 Finally, the findings also pose critical questions to other empirical studies 
regarding the impact of ethnic diversity (e.g. public goods provision) that have paid 
inadequate attention to its theoretical complexity. Perhaps, the ultimate message of the 
present study for future empirical research is a traditional one: empirical efforts regarding 
data collection and statistical scrutiny are of utmost significance, but they must be piloted 
by a robust theoretical framework in order to answer at best the question they are 
designed to cope with at the first place. 
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Appendix A: Data Description. 
 
1. Main Results 
• Transfers and Subsidies: General government, percentage of GDP, average of the period 
2000-2005. Source: Gwartney, Hall, and Lawson (2012). 
• Social Expenditure: Public sector, percentage of GDP, average of the period 2000-2005. 
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Statistics. 
• Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index: An ethnic diversity index based on language, account 
for the distinctiveness between groups. Source: Desmet et al. (2012). 
• Gini Index: Gross income, average of the period 1990-1999. Source: Solt (2009), SWIID 
Version 3.1. 
• Average Years of Schooling: Population aged 15 and above, data for 1990. Source: Cohen 
and Soto (2007). 
• Ethno-Federalism: Dummy variable, ethno-federalist countries are coded 1. Source: Charron 
(2009). 
• Fraction of Population over 65: Average of the period 1990-1999. World Development 
Indicators, World Bank. Data for Taiwan is taken from National Statistics, Republic of China. 
• Socialist Legal Origin: Dummy variable, socialist legal origin countries are coded 1. Source: 
La Porta et al. (1999). 
• GDP Per Capita: Natural logarithm, constant 2000 USD, average of the period 1990-1999. 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. Data for Taiwan is taken from National 
Statistics, Republic of China. 
• Openness: share of exports and imports in GDP, natural logarithm, 2005 constant price, 
average of the period 1990-1999. Source: Heston et al. (2011). 
• Plurality Electoral Rule: Dummy variable, countries with plurality electoral rule are coded 1, 
data for the period 2000-2005. Source: Beck et al. (2001). Updated 2010. 
 
2. Robustness 
• Regional Dummies: Countries from Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, or 
East Asia and Pacific are coded 1. Source: World Bank. 
• Polarization Index: A measure of ethnic polarization based on language that takes into 
account the distinctiveness between groups. Source: Desmet et al. (2012). 
• Democracy Index: Average of the period 2000-2005. Source: POLITY IV Project.
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Appendix B: Summary Statistics and Pairwise Correlation of Main Variables. 
 





Deviation Min Max 
A. Transfers and Subsidies as  
Percentage of GDP (2000-2005) 129 8.84 7.47 0.18 28.88 
B. Social Expenditure as Percentage of  
GDP (2000-2005) 34 19.55 5.87 5.54 29.47 
C. ELF index at the Fifth Level of  
Linguistic Aggregation 128 0.33 0.26 0 0.90 
D. Gini index for Gross Income 
(1990-1999) 119 44.54 7.46 30.50 67.11 
E. Average Years of Schooling (1990) 84 5.99 3.38 0.22 12.44 
F. Ethno-Federalism 127 0.09 0.28 0 1 
G. Fraction of Population over 65  
(1990-1999) 129 7.27 4.60 1.04 17.52 
H. Socialist Legal Origin 128 0.19 0.39 0 1 
I. Ln GDP Per Capita (1990-1999) 129 7.76 1.60 4.76 10.52 
J. Ln Openness (1990-1999) 127 4.16 0.56 2.80 5.75 
K. Plurality Electoral (2000-2005) 115 0.63 0.49 0 1 
 
2. Pairwise Correlations 
 A B C D E F G H I J K 
A 1.00           
B 0.86 1.00          
C 0.03 0.05 1.00         
D 0.09 0.16 -0.30 1.00        
E 0.25 0.33 -0.04 -0.19 1.00       
F 0.00 0.10 0.52 -0.29 0.16 1.00      
G 0.76 0.87 0.15 0.04 0.29 0.18 1.00     
H -0.02 -0.09 0.18 -0.16 -0.46 -0.12 0.06 1.00    
I 0.50 0.55 0.13 -0.17 0.77 0.21 0.60 -0.55 1.00   
J 0.52 0.31 0.39 -0.02 -0.12 0.24 0.28 0.25 -0.02 1.00  
K -0.42 -0.31 -0.12 -0.08 0.28 0.15 -0.18 -0.04 -0.05 -0.58 1.00 
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Appendix C: 






0 .1 .3 .5 .7 .9 1
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index, 5th Level of Linguistic Aggregation
Note: Standard errors calculated by Delta method.
Marginal Effects at 95% Confidence Interval
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